Posts Tagged ‘adaptation’

Comment on Pielke Jr’s main conclusions

November 4, 2009

Roger Pielke Jr invites comments “from his loudest critics” on his views regarding climate change and response strategies. I’m not even close to being his loudest critic (e.g. he’s often got interesting analyses on the policy), allthough the occasional badmouthing of scientists gets on my nerve. Anyway, here are my replies, each directly following Pielke’s point in italics.

1. There is no greenhouse gas signal in the economic or human toll record of disasters.(Pielke)
I don’t know; his work in this area appears quite robust at first sight, though many conflicting results have also been reported. The PDI (power dissipation index, a measure of hurricane power) has increased though, at least in the North Atlantic. Overall, the jury is still out on the hurricane question it seems like. It’s however not an area that I’ve looked at in detail.

2. The IPCC has dramatically underestimated the scale of the stabilization challenge. (Pielke)
I don’t know, but see also 8.

3. Geoengineering via stratospheric injection or marine cloud whitening is a bad idea. (Pielke)
At this point in time, intentionally cooling the Earth via large scale intervention is definitely a bad idea, because of the risks involved. But we may reach a point where the climate risks start to outweigh the geoengineering risks. So I think it prudent to investigate geoengineering schemes in case of climate emergencies. I agree with Ken Caldeira: “I hope I never need a parachute, but if my plane is going down in flames, I sure hope I have a parachute handy,” Caldeira said. “I hope we’ll never need geoengineering schemes, but if a climate catastrophe occurs, I sure hope we will have thought through our options carefully.” I contributed to an assessment of “other” climate reduction possibilities, for which I wrote chapter 6 on geo-engineering and air capture. In Section 6.4 the context and associated risks are discussed. In short, geoengineering should absolutely not be considered as an *alternative* to emission reduction, since the long term risks would increase to intolerable levels in such a case, and problems such as ocean acidification would continue unabated. I plan to write more about geoengineering here in the near future.

4. Air capture research is a very good idea. (Pielke)
Agreed (though it’s not a holy grail; it’s not even close to large scale implementation). I would perhaps single out biochar application as especially promising, since it appears to have numerous co-benefits. Its global scale climate mitigation effects seem to be limited though.

5. Adaptation is very important and not a trade off with mitigation. (Pielke)
Both adaptation and mitigation (emission reduction) are important, but I would emphasize the latter, since it dominates the long-term risk we expose future generations to (CO2 has a very long lifetime). Over-emphasizing the former risks de-emphasizing the latter, so it’s a tricky balance. The four basic response strategies (emission reduction – air capture – geoengineering – adaptation) are not mutually exclusive, but each of them lowers the (perceived) necessity for the other measures to be implemented (if the long lifetime of CO2 is ignored, which is well beyond the average political radarscreen).

Roger claims that “adaptation is a trade-off with mitigation just as mitigation is a trade off with military spending.” I think that a Euro spent on adaptation competes more strongly with spending it on mitigation than that it competes with spending it on the military. If anything, adaptation and mitigation are decided upon by the same department, with one overall budget. The military budget is separate (unfortunately, I may add).

It may be worthwhile to investigate potential win-win situations: Adaptation measures that simultaneously mitigate climate change, and vice versa (see chapter 4 of the same document as mentioned above for some examples, e.g. green/white roofs, reforestation, spatial planning, etc). Black carbon (soot) reduction is an example of a measure with both health and climate benefits. Those may be the politically speaking low hanging fruit.

6. Current mitigation policies, at national and international levels, are inevitably doomed to fail. (Pielke)
It all comes down to what is being decided in the political process. I am however pessimistic about the politics coming up to speed with what is known scientifically (short version) and what is possible technologically (which is a lot more than what is on the political table, see also 8). But let’s try to avoid self fulfilling prophecies.
David Keith made some pertinent comments to this:

However when people and the political community hear technical people say “can’t be done” they assume we mean that technically can’t be done and that is untrue and destructive.
It’s destructive because it hides the central moral choice: we could cut emissions if we want to, we could have started decades ago when the scientific warnings about climate change were first raised, but we decided not to. It was a choice, implicit or not. A choice that, in effect, we cared more about current consumption than we did about preserving our grandchildren’s chances to enjoy a climate like the one in which our civilization developed.

Nothing is “doomed to fail”; we have the choice.

7. An alternative approach to mitigation from that of the FCCC has better prospects for success. (Pielke)
I don’t know. Depends what the proposed alternative is I guess.

8. Current technologies are not sufficient to reach mitigation goals. (Pielke)
Perhaps that is the case for the long term, but I think it bears stressing that current technologies are hopelessly underused. David Keith, Joe Romm and others have pointed out that even with current technology we could decarbonize the entire electricity production for a few % of GDP. The per capita emissions in the US are double those in the EU. The per capita electricity use in California is a bit over half of that of the rest of the US. There’s clearly a lot more we can do with current technology and other (efficiency) measures than we are currently doing. That doesn’t negate the importance of R&D, but it’s the point I would like to stress. R&D is still needed to make emission reductions cheaper, and to make bigger and faster reductions possible. But it shouldn’t be an excuse for not doing more with the possibilities we currently have. See for a longer argument somewhat along these lines (rebutting Lomborg) here.

9. In their political enthusiasm, some leading scientists have behaved badly. (Pielke)
Without specifics, this is impossible to answer, and is bound to lead to even more misunderstanding. I could try reading your mind of course. You probably have some of your critics in mind, notably some RealClimate scientists as well as Hansen, who you have criticized. I find this very problematic. In most instances that I followed (involving Gavin Schmidt, Michael Tobis, Eric Steig, Hansen, Briffa at different occasions), I have found your and others’ criticisms off base, besides the point, largely irrelevant to the bigger picture and having the smell of a smear campaign (science-bashing). As I commented regarding the latest McIntyre affair (see my review here): “A lot of scientists are getting understandably frustrated with self-proclaimed auditors of science (and their supporters) who cast doubt about a whole scientific field by blowing minor flaws out of proportion and insinuate accusations of scientific misconduct”. Against this backdrop of a lot of people ready to embrace any little nitpicked criticism as if it overthrows the whole scientific consensus, and ignore the mountain of evidence in favour of this consensus, I can perfectly well understand that a lot of scientists (and their supporters) are getting frustrated having to deal with this behavior and (mostly) fake arguments. In the grand scheme of things, the big problem as I see it is the contempt of science and its practitioners by a sizeable segment of the general public and some high profile bloggers; if a scientist responds to faux criticism in a frustrated tone, I find that a minor flaw in comparison. Granted, they (climate scientists) are your subject of study, so you naturally focus on their behaviour, but at the same time, please consider the context in which they operate, as well as the main message they are trying to convey. In light of this, your claim that “bad behavior by the folks at Real Climate does more to hurt the cause for action than the political actions of the skeptics” is preposterous. William Connolley brought up Fred Singer as the most obvious example.

10. Leading scientific assessments have botched major issues (like disasters). (Pielke)
I don’t know.

The bottom line is that I don’t strongly disagree with Pielke Jr on many points, but that I find his choice of ‘problem areas’ to focus on peculiar and often unhelpful in light of the much bigger problems just adjacent to them (e.g. 9, 8, 5). Excluding that context risks giving a false impression of what’s going on, especially to those who are not in the loop and to those wishing to see their pre-conceived notions confirmed.

Sea level rise and the Dutch Deltacommission

September 9, 2008

(Nederlanse versie hier)

 

The Dutch Deltacommittee released their report on how to protect the Netherlands against the rising waters. The advice goes quite far, from the inevitable heightening of dikes to increasing the waterlevel of the major lake by 1.5 meters.

 

Starting point

The starting point is an estimate of sealevel rise of 0.55 to 1.1 metres by 2100 and of 2 to 4 metres by 2200. To their credit, the prognosis doesn’t stop in 2100, and neither does sealevel rise. In a business as usual scenario the sealevel will continue to rise (long) after 2200. The report mentions that they use a “plausible upper bound” of sealevel rise. A comparable range (0.5 to 1.4 metres by 2100) is found by extrapolating the observed correlation between temperature and sealevel rise.

 

The consequences of ice dynamics (e.g. mechanical instability of large ice sheets due to  more meltwater, associated with large uncertainties) is included in their estimate. That is the main reason that they are higher than the KNMI and IPCC estimates for 2100 (40 to 85 cm and 25 to 76 cm for 2100, respectively). A new article in the journal Science gives 80 cm as the most likely sealevel rise for 2100, and 2 metres as the upper bound (including uncertainties related to ice dynamics). Besides uncertainties regarding ice melt, the future greenhouse gas emissions are of course an important variable, and one that we can influence (for better or for worse).  Realclimate has a discussion of sealevel rise here and a thorough review of the IPCC estimates here.

 

Adaptation…?

Can the Netherlands adapt to such high sealevels? The Deltacommitte is very positive about that, at least up to a 4 metre (!) sealevel rise. I think that at some point the possibilities for adaptation become limited. For example, can the Netherlands continue to exist amidst a sealevel that is 6 metres higher than now? That’s what sealevels were 125,000 years ago, when the global average temperature was “only” 1 to 2 degrees higher than now. Such a massive change in sealevel probably takes centuries, if not millennia, to achieve, but it makes sense to me that we’d try to avoid it from happening nevertheless. Therefore we cannot afford to keep the earth very long or very high above the 1-2 degrees higher temperature. For how long or how high can we, before the big icesheets (Greenland and the Antarctic) start melting irreversibly? Nobody knows. But it’s not worth an experiment, I’d say.

 

Mitigation…!

The emphasis in the committee’s report is strongly on adaptation to rising sealevels, although emission reduction (mitigation) is of course also necessary. Otherwise it’s like mopping while the tap is running, as we say in Dutch. Is it perhaps better to relocate certain economic activities to safer grounds instead of pumping large sums of money into keeping them in the current low lying and vulnerable area? One comment I heard is from a member of parliament, who wondered whether our (grand)children would be happy  to pay for the measures we’d be taking now (because part of the money would be borrowed is the plan). I think that if anything, they will complain that we did too little for the problems facing us than too much.

 

To what extent should we anticipate (and thus adapt to and trying to prevent) future problems, that haven’t manifested themselves to their full extent? That’s a debate that’s worth having. Science doesn’t tell us which risks are worth taking and which are not; that’s very much an individual choice. Science does have an important role in informing us about the chances of a certain outcome; in other words, about the risk. The difficulty is that an individual’s choice in this matter has consequences for the risks of others, but their own risk is only marginally affected: the “tragedy of the commons”. Governments also have to make choices regarding the safety of their citizens. The same tragedy plays there too: The risk we run is strongly dependent on what other countries do. But let’s not use that as an excuse to then not do anything ourselves. And let’s not use scientific uncertainty as an excuse either. It does not decrease the risk; to the contrary.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 126 other followers